




CAN THE US SHALE REVOLUTION  


























Over	 the	 past	 decade,	 the	 rapid	 increase	 in	 shale	 gas	 and	 shale	 oil	 production	 in	 the	
United	States	has	profoundly	changed	energy	markets	in	North	America,	and	has	led	to	a	
significant	decrease	in	American	natural	gas	prices.	The	possible	existence	of	large	shale	
deposits	 in	 Europe,	 mainly	 in	 France,	 Poland	 and	 the	 United	 Kingdom,	 has	 fostered	
speculation	 on	whether	 the	 "shale	 revolution",	 and	 its	 accompanying	macroeconomic	
impacts,	 could	 be	 duplicated	 in	 Europe.	 However,	 a	 number	 of	 uncertainties,	 notably	
geological,	 technological	 and	 regulatory,	 make	 this	 possibility	 unclear.	 We	 present	 a	
techno‐economic	 model,	 SHERPA	 (SHale	 Exploitation	 and	 Recovery	 Projection	 and	
Analysis),	to	analyze	the	main	determinants	of	the	profitability	of	shale	wells	and	plays.	
We	 calibrate	our	model	using	production	data	 from	 the	 leading	American	 shale	plays.	
We	 use	 SHERPA	 to	 estimate	 three	 shale	 gas	 production	 scenarios	 exploring	 different	
sets	of	geological	and	technical	hypotheses	for	the	largest	potential	holder	of	shale	gas	
deposits	 in	 Europe,	 France.	 Even	 considering	 that	 the	 geology	 of	 the	 potential	 French	
shale	 deposits	 is	 favorable	 to	 commercial	 extraction,	 we	 find	 that	 under	 assumptions	
calibrated	on	U.S.	production	data,	natural	gas	could	be	produced	at	a	high	breakeven	
price	of	$8.6	per	MMBtu,	and	over	a	45	year	timeframe	have	a	net	present	value	of	$19.6	
billion	–	 less	 than	1%	of	2012	French	GDP.	However,	 the	specificities	of	 the	European	
context,	 notably	 high	 deposit	 depth	 and	 stricter	 environmental	 regulations,	 could	
increase	 drilling	 costs	 and	 further	 decrease	 this	 low	profitability.	We	 find	 that	 a	 40%	
premium	over	American	drilling	 costs	would	make	shale	gas	extraction	uneconomical.	
Absent	 extreme	well	 productivity,	 it	 appears	 very	 difficult	 for	 shale	 gas	 extraction	 to	








Energy	 Policy	 Act	 of	 2005	 (Pub.L.	 109–58,	 2005),	 have	 made	 these	 new	 natural	 gas	 reserves	
commercially	exploitable.	
	





decline	 between	 1985	 and	 2008,	 domestic	 U.S.	 crude	 oil	 production	 has	 increased	 by	 55%	 since	
2008	to	reach	7.4	MMbbl/day	in	2013.	
	
The	 rapid	 expansion	 of	 U.S.	 fossil	 fuel	 production	 has	 had	 a	 number	 of	macroeconomic	 impacts,	
notably	 in	 the	 form	of	 increased	activity	 from	intensive	drilling,	 lowered	natural	gas	prices,	and	a	
reduction	 in	 fossil	 fuel	 imports.	 However,	 the	 magnitude	 of	 these	 impacts	 remains	 a	 matter	 of	
controversy.	Some	reports,	notably	IHS	(2011)	and	IHS	(2013),	have	estimated	that	drilling	activity,	
combined	 with	 the	 on	 shoring	 of	 some	 industries	 back	 in	 the	 United	 States	 –	 petrochemical	 in	
particular	–	could	support	up	to	870,000	jobs	by	2015.		
	
These	 conclusions	 are	 challenged	 by	 studies	 such	 as	 EMF	 (2013)	 or	 Spencer,	 Sartor	 &	 Mathieu	
(2014).	 Recognizing	 that	 shale	 well	 drilling	 only	 has	 a	 highly	 localized	 impact	 on	 activity	 and	
employment,	 EMF	 (2013)	 estimates	 that	 shale	 development	would	 only	 boost	 GDP	 by	 “a	modest	
0.46%”,	 and	 downplays	 the	 importance	 of	 shale	 gas	 as	 a	 “game‐changer”	 for	 the	 U.S.	 economy.	
Similarly,	 Spencer,	 Sartor	 &	 Mathieu	 (2014)	 highlight	 that	 the	 small	 share	 of	 energy‐intensive	
industries	 in	 the	 U.S.	 economy	 and	 of	 natural	 gas	 expenditures	 in	 households’	 budgets	 limit	 the	
overall	macroeconomic	impact	that	can	be	expected	from	the	steep	reduction	in	natural	gas	prices.		
	
Still,	 the	existence	of	potentially	 large	shale	deposits	 in	Europe,	notably	 in	France,	Poland	and	the	
United	 Kingdom,	 has	 fostered	 speculation	 on	 whether	 the	 oft‐called	 “shale	 revolution”	 could	 be	
duplicated	 on	 the	 continent.	 This	 issue	 is	 particularly	 relevant	 for	 natural	 gas,	 as	 European	
dependency	 on	 foreign	 exports	 has	 important	 energy	 security	 and	 geopolitical	 ramifications,	
notably	vis‐à‐vis	the	Russian	Federation	(IEA,	2012).		
	
Gény	 (2010)	 examines	 this	 issue	 and	 concludes	 that	 the	 large	 differences	 in	 terms	 of	 onshore	
drilling	 industry	 maturity,	 ease	 of	 access	 to	 land,	 mineral	 ownership	 rights	 and	 environmental	
regulations	make	U.S.	operational	and	business	model	for	shale	gas	development	inapplicable	to	the	
European	 context.	 Absent	 a	 focus	 on	 geological	 “sweet	 spots,	 R&D,	 workforce	 training,	 and	 new	







gas	 wells	 productivity	 or	 on	 drilling	 costs	 in	 Europe.	 In	 the	 present	 paper,	 we	 propose	 to	










The	 paper	 is	 structured	 as	 follows:	 we	 first	 present	 a	 techno‐economic	 model,	 SHERPA	 (SHale	






present	 three	 scenarios	 of	 production	 based	 on	 different	 geological	 and	 technical	 hypotheses	 for	
France,	 the	 largest	potential	holder	of	 shale	gas	deposits	 in	Europe;	 estimate	 them	with	SHERPA;	
and	conclude.	
2 Modeling	shale	production	
In	 order	 to	 model	 shale	 production	 scenarios	 in	 Europe	 and	 identify	 the	 main	 parameters	 that	
determine	 the	 cost	 of	 the	 production	 flow	 along	with	 its	 volume,	we	 develop	 a	 techno‐economic	
















where	ݍ଴	is	 the	 initial	 production,	ܦ଴	the	 initial	 decline	 rate,	 and	ܾ	(0 ൑ ܾ ൑ 1)	 a	 parameter	controlling	the	evolution	of	the	decline	rate	over	time.	The	parameter	ܾ	notably	determines	the	type	
of	decline	(see	Figure	1):		
	
 exponential	 (ܾ ൌ 0),	where	production	decreases	over	 time	with	a	constant	decline	rate.	 If	
this	 decline	 rate	 is	 high,	 most	 of	 the	 production	 is	 front‐loaded	 over	 the	 first	 years	 of	
exploitation;		
 hyperbolic	 (0 ൏ ܾ ൏ 1),	where	 the	decline	 rate	decreases	over	 time.	 If	 this	decrease	 is	 fast	
enough,	the	impact	of	high	initial	decline	rates	on	the	well’s	production	can	be	balanced	by	a	
longer	well	lifespan;	
 harmonic	(ܾ ൌ 1),	which	is	a	special	case	of	hyperbolic	decline.	It	is	the	slowest	of	all	three	
types	of	declines,	i.e.	the	one	that	yields	the	largest	late‐life	production	flows.	
	




















ݍ௡ ൌ ݍ଴ሺ1 െ ߜ௡ሻ௡ (2)	
The	total	production	over	the	well’s	lifetime,	ܰ௪,	which	amounts	to	its	Estimated	Ultimate	Recovery	(EUR),	becomes:	
	



















݌∗ ൌ ܿ݉ ൅ ܫ





In	 order	 to	 model	 the	 total	 production	 of	 a	 play,	 we	 consider	 the	 production	 profile	 of	 a	
representative	 well.	 Thus,	 we	 capture	 the	 diversity	 observed	 across	 American	 plays	 in	 well	
productivity	 and	 decline	 speed	 solely	 through	 this	 “average”	 well.	 This	 approach	 allows	 us	 to	
analyze	 the	 aggregate	 production	 of	 the	 play	 across	 its	 entire	 lifespan.	 This	 hypothesis	 is	 a	
simplification	since	it	is	well	documented	that	the	productivity	of	shale	wells	vary	greatly,	including	
within	a	single	play	(EIA,	2011).	However,	it	is	expected	that	this	diversity	would	mostly	bear	on	the	
dynamics	of	 the	drilling	effort	–	with	 the	most	productive	spots	being	drilled	 first	once	 identified.	
Characterizing	the	representative	average	is	sufficient	to	estimate	field‐wide	variables	of	interest	to	













ܦோ ൌ max଴ஸ௡ஸே೛ ܦ௡





ܳ௡ ൑ ܦோݍ଴ߜ 	 (8)	
This	 inequality	 illustrates	 an	 important	 phenomenon.	 The	 production	 of	 the	 play	 is	 at	 all	 times	
bounded	by	a	production	plateau,	whose	value	only	depends	on	the	average	initial	production,	the	
lower	 bound	of	 the	decline	 rate	 across	 the	 lifespan	of	 the	 representative	well,	 and	 the	maximum	
drilling	rate.	As	the	drilling	rate	increases	towards	its	maximum	value,	and	as	the	play	matures,	the	
production	 of	 the	 entire	 play	 actually	 converges	 towards	 a	 plateau	which	 is	 strictly	 bounded	 by	
equation	 7,	 with	 the	 speed	 of	 convergence	 depending	 on	 the	 steepness	 of	 the	 decline	 rate.	 This	
plateau	corresponds	to	the	phase	 in	the	play	 life	cycle	when	drilling	new	wells	can	only	offset	the	
declining	production	of	old	wells,	without	increasing	the	aggregate	production	of	the	play.	Yet,	if	the	
average	decline	rate	 is	 low,	 this	plateau	can	be	so	high	as	 to	never	be	bounding	within	 the	play’s	
lifespan.		
	
Indeed,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 conventional	 oil	 and	 gas	 fields,	 the	 observed	 annual	 decline	 rates	 can	 be	
estimated	to	be	around	3	to	4	%	(Höök,	Hirsch,	&	Aleklett,	2009):	in	that	case,	the	production	of	the	
field	remains	below	95	%	of	the	plateau’s	value	during	the	first	75	years	of	extraction.	However,	for	
annual	decline	 rates	 closer	 to	 the	50%	 levels	 observed	on	 shale	deposits	 (see	Table	3),	 the	 same	
threshold	can	be	reached	within	four	years	only.	
	
This	 phenomenon	 of	 production	 plateau,	 where	 new	 wells	 are	 only	 drilled	 to	 maintain	 existing	
production	 volume,	 is	 thus	 characteristic	 of	 shale	 plays.	 Once	 reached,	 breaching	 the	 production	
plateau	 entails	 improving	 well	 productivity	 through	 better	 technology,	 or	 increasing	 the	 drilling	
rate.	Geological	constraints	can	set	hard	limits	on	well	productivity,	although	recent	improvement	in	




Calibrating	 the	 equation	describing	 the	production	profile	of	 the	 representative	well	 (equation	2)	






It	 is	 therefore	 necessary	 to	 gather	 this	 calibration	 data	 from	 a	 different	 source.	 Ever	 since	 the	
commercial	 extraction	of	 shale	deposits	 began	during	 the	 last	decade,	 close	 to	60	 shale	gas	plays	
have	 been	 drilled	 in	 the	 United	 States	 (Hughes,	 2013).	 30	 out	 of	 these	 60	 plays	 have	 proved	
profitable,	with	only	six	of	those	accounting	for	more	than	90%	of	the	total	natural	gas	production	











and	 Fayetteville.	 The	 production	 data	 was	 obtained	 from	 the	 Louisiana	 Department	 of	 Natural	
Resources	and	from	the	Arkansas	Oil	and	Gas	Commission.	We	therefore	restrict	our	analysis	to	the	
portion	of	 the	Haynesville	play	 located	 in	Louisiana	 and	 the	Arkansas	 section	of	Fayetteville.	Our	














We	find	that	the	evolution	of	 initial	production	exhibits	a	common	pattern	in	both	plays.	 In	a	 first	
period,	 ranging	 from	2006	 to	2009	 in	Haynesville	and	 from	2005	to	2010	 in	Fayetteville,	 average	
initial	productions	gradually	increase	with	drilling	year.	Provided	that	decline	rates	remain	constant	
across	drilling	 years,	 this	 indicates	 an	 improvement	 in	well	 productivity	 over	 time	 in	 each	of	 the	
plays.	 Indeed,	 a	 simultaneous	 increase	 of	 decline	 rates	 over	 time	 could	 cancel	 out	 the	 impact	 of	
improved	initial	productions	over	the	well’s	total	lifecycle	production.	
	
This	 improvement	 can	 be	 driven	 by	 at	 least	 two	 causes:	 an	 improvement	 in	 extraction	 and	










Once	 this	 learning	 phase	 is	 over,	 average	 initial	 production	 reaches	 a	 stable	 level	 that	 has	 been	
roughly	maintained	to	the	present,	although	the	distribution	of	 initial	productions	has	varied	over	









	 Haynesville	 Barnett Marcellus Fayetteville Eagle	Ford	 Woodford
Initial	production	







portion	of	 the	plays	 located	 in	 States	 that	 release	public	production	data	 from	operators;	 second,	
Hughes’	(2013)	averages	are	calculated	over	every	wells	ever	drilled	in	the	play	–	even	though	our	
analysis	 shows	 that	 there	 has	 been	 a	 significant	 increase	 in	 initial	 productions	 over	 time.	 This	
implies	 that	 estimates	 of	 average	 initial	 production	 made	 over	 the	 whole	 play’s	 lifespan	 are	




The	 data	 provided	 by	 the	 Arkansas	 Oil	 and	 Gas	 Commission	 for	 the	 Fayetteville	 play	 includes	
monthly	production	reports	by	well.	This	allows	us	to	estimate	average	decline	rates	over	the	entire	




after	 one	 to	 five	 years	 of	 extraction,	 as	 a	 function	 of	 the	 well’s	 drilling	 year.	 The	 decline	 in	
production	over	time	is	very	steep:	after	three	years,	the	production	flow	is	reduced	on	average	to	







only	 1%	 of	 the	 sample,	 the	 average	 decrease	 in	 production	 after	 one	 to	 five	 years	 is	 remarkably	
stable	 over	 drilling	 years	 –	 and	 therefore,	 so	 are	 the	 associated	 decline	 rates.	 This	 indicates	 that	
unlike	 initial	 production,	 the	 average	well’s	 production	 profile	 does	 not	 exhibit	 a	 learning	 phase	
after	 which	 observed	 decline	 rates	 would	 be	 reduced.	 It	 is	 therefore	 reasonable	 to	 assume	 that	
average	 decline	 rates	 estimated	 over	 the	whole	 play’s	 lifespan	 are	 applicable	 to	 the	most	 recent	




	 Decline	in	year	1	 Decline	in	year	2 Decline	in	year	3 Decline	in	year	4	 Decline	in	year	5








	 Haynesville	 Barnett	 Marcellus	
Decline	in	year	1	 68%	 61%	 47%	
Decline	in	year	2	 49%	 32%	 66%	
Decline	in	year	3	 50%	 24%	 71%	
Decline	in	year	4	 48%	 18%	 47%	
Decline	in	year	5	 	 15%	 	
Source	:	Hughes	(2013)	
	
First,	Table	2	 and	Table	3	 illustrate	 the	 large	diversity	of	decline	 rates	observed	across	 shale	 gas	
plays.	 Second,	 we	 find	 that	 in	 general,	 the	 production	 decline	 cannot	 be	 described	 as	 either	
exponential,	 since	 the	 annual	 decline	 rate	 varies	 over	 the	 well’s	 lifespan,	 nor	 hyperbolic,	 since	




The	 production	 profile	 of	 the	 representative	well	 is	 tied	 to	 the	 specific	 shale	 play	 considered,	 in	
particular	to	its	geological	characteristics.	Still,	in	keeping	with	our	approach	of	using	historical	U.S.	
production	 data	 to	 calibrate	 SHERPA,	 we	 use	 a	 weighted	 average	 of	 the	 decline	 rates	 estimated	




Decline	in	year	1 Decline	in	year2 Decline	in	year3 Decline	in	year4 Decline	in	year	5	




The	 large	 drop	 in	 natural	 gas	 prices	 over	 the	 past	 decade,	 from	 a	 weekly	 average	 high	 of	
14.49	$/MMBtu	in	December	2005	to	a	low	of	1.86	$/MMBtu	in	April	20122	(see	Figure	4),	has	been	
one	of	 the	more	 significant	 consequences	of	 the	 large	 increase	 in	domestic	 gas	 production	 in	 the	
United	States.		
	
Unlike	 other	 energy	 commodities,	 crude	 oil	 in	 particular,	 the	 market	 for	 natural	 gas	 is	 still	
fragmented	 into	 several	 regional	 markets.	 The	 price	 of	 natural	 gas	 is	 therefore	 different	 in	 the	















Besides,	 gas	price	 formation	mechanisms	are	distinct	 in	each	of	 the	major	markets.	 In	 the	United	
States,	 the	price	of	natural	gas	 is	 set	 through	gas‐on‐gas	competition.	Natural	gas	 is	 traded	over	a	
variety	of	time	frames	(e.g.	daily,	monthly	or	annually)	at	a	number	of	physical	hubs	–	Texas’s	Henry	
Hub	 being	 the	 largest	 –,	 and	 the	 interplay	 of	 supply	 and	demand	determines	 the	price.	 In	 such	 a	
market,	changes	 in	 the	balance	between	supply	and	demand	have	an	 immediate	 impact	on	prices.	
The	United	States,	which	until	the	late	2000s	expected	domestic	natural	gas	production	to	decline,	
had	 built	 LNG	 plants	 to	 import	 gas,	 but	 not	 to	 export	 it	 (EIA,	 2011).	When	 shale	 gas	 extraction	
rapidly	grew,	the	newfound	domestic	production	of	natural	gas	changed	the	local	balance	of	supply	




















For	 our	 main	 scenarios,	 we	 use	 the	 Russian	 Natural	 Gas	 border	 price	 in	 Germany,	 which	 is	 a	
common	benchmark	for	gas	prices	in	continental	Europe,	averaged	over	the	period	2011‐2013.	We	






























	 Haynesville	 Barnett	 Marcellus	 Fayetteville	 Woodford	 Granite	Wash	
Average	drilling	
costs	(million	USD)	 9.5	 3.5	 5.3	 2.8	 8.5	 7.8	
Average	depth	




wells	 are	 located	 in	 the	 deepest	 shale	 deposits,	 between	 12,000	 and	 13,000	 ft	 on	 average.	 Most	
European	 deposits	 have	 been	 identified	 in	 geological	 strata	 located	 at	 comparable	 depth	:	 the	
majority	 of	 the	French	 resources	would	be	 found	between	10,000	and	14,000	 ft,	 between	10,000	
and	12,500	ft	in	Poland,	between	11,500	and	14,500	ft	in	Germany,	between	11,000	and	12,500	ft	in	











Finally,	 it	 should	be	noted	 that	 the	availability	of	drilling	equipment	 is	much	higher	 in	 the	United	
States	than	in	Europe.	In	the	first	quarter	of	2014,	more	than	1,700	drilling	rigs	were	being	operated	
in	 the	 United	 States,	 including	 both	 oil	 and	 gas	 plays	 of	 the	 conventional	 and	 unconventional	
varieties	 (EIA,	 2014).	 This	 is	 to	 be	 contrasted	with	 less	 than	 a	 hundred	 rigs	 available	 across	 the	
entire	European	continent	in	2013	(Hsieh,	2011).	Further,	only	a	small	fraction	of	these	rigs	can	be	
used	to	drill	shale	gas	wells:	for	example,	in	2011,	out	of	15	drilling	rigs	available	in	Poland,	only	5	





the	 expansion	 of	 commercial	 shale	 gas	 extraction	 was	 also	 enabled	 by	 changes	 made	 to	 the	
																																																													
4	“Shale‐Gas	Drilling	Cost	in	Poland	Triple	U.S.,	Schlumberger	Says”,	Bloomberg,	29	November	2011	






defined	 new	 core	 principles	 for	 American	 energy	 policy,	with	 a	 particular	 emphasis	 on	 reducing	
future	dependency	on	fossil	fuel	imports.	The	Act	included	a	number	of	measures	aiming	to	increase	
domestic	 fossil	 fuel	 production.	 Notably,	 two	 existing	 environmental	 laws	 were	 amended	 to	
facilitate	the	use	of	hydraulic	fracturing	–	and	thus	the	extraction	of	oil	and	gas	from	shale	deposits:		
	




















outright	 forbidden	 under	 the	 current	 European	 environmental	 legislation,	 both	 at	 the	 Union	 and	





amend	 their	 existing	 legislations	 to	 lift	 some	 of	 the	 restrictions	 currently	 limiting	 the	 use	 of	
hydraulic	fracturing.	Fostering	shale	gas	production	on	their	territory	would	entail	rescinding	part	
of	 their	 environmental	 protection	 framework	 to	 favor	 domestic	 on	 shore	 drilling,	 as	 the	 Energy	





Based	 on	 the	 calibration	 obtained	 from	 the	 statistical	 analysis	 of	 U.S.	 production	 data,	we	 design	
production	 scenarios	 for	 France,	 which	 is	 the	 largest	 potential	 holder	 of	 shale	 gas	 deposits	 in	
Europe.	 We	 focus	 our	 analysis	 on	 natural	 gas	 as	 according	 to	 EIA	 (2013),	 estimated	 technically	
recoverable	 resources	 of	 shale	 gas	 dwarf	 those	 of	 shale	 and	 tight	 oil	 in	 Europe.	 To	 simplify	 the	
analysis,	we	 consider	 the	 two	potential	 shale	 fields	 in	 France,	 the	Paris	 basin	 and	 the	 South‐East	
basin,	as	one	single	field,	on	which	we	formulate	aggregate	hypotheses.		
	
Further,	 our	 price	 hypotheses	 are	 based	 on	 the	 assumption	 that	 dry	 gas	 will	 be	 produced	 and	





 The	 «	Central	»	 scenario	 aims	 to	 estimate	what	 a	 realistic	 production	 scenario	would	 be,	
should	the	geology	of	the	French	shale	deposits	prove	favorable	to	commercial	extraction.		
Based	on	this	hypothesis,	we	assume	that	well	productivity	would	be	comparable	to	that	of	




the	 deposit	 depth.	 We	 therefore	 assume	 average	 drilling	 costs	 of	 $10	 million.	 This	 last	




























1)	Central	 2,200	 10,0	 30	
2)	Zero	NPV	 2,200	 13,3	 30	












Finally,	we	assume	 that	 shale	 gas	extraction	will	 be	managed	by	a	 state‐owned	company.	 Indeed,	
calls	 have	been	made	–	 notably	by	 the	French	 Industry	Minister	 –	 for	 shale	 gas	production	 to	be	
carried	out	by	a	public	body,	should	the	ban	on	shale	gas	exploration	and	extraction	be	lifted5.	This	
leads	us	to	use	a	discount	rate	of	4%	in	the	calculation	of	net	present	values,	as	 it	 is	 the	standard	






















1)	Central	 	8.6	 	1.4	 491	 10%	 	19.6	
2)	Zero	NPV	 	11.2	 	1.4	 491	 10%	 	0	














Finally,	 the	 third	 scenario	 highlights	 the	 importance	 of	 well	 productivity	 in	 determining	 the	















The	 aggregate	 natural	 gas	 production	 increases	 over	 the	 first	 15	 years	 of	 the	 scenario,	 before	
reaching	a	plateau	until	year	30.	This	 illustrates	 the	phenomenon	of	production	plateau	described	







The	 large	upfront	drilling	costs	 lead	 to	negative	cash	 flows	 for	 the	 first	 five	years	of	 the	scenario.	
This	negative	runway	increases	for	the	first	3	years	of	the	scenario	as	the	drilling	rate	is	ramped	up	
to	 30	wells	 per	month.	 The	 positive	 spike	 in	 cash‐flow	 in	 year	 31	 corresponds	 to	 the	 end	 of	 the	


































1a)	Wet	gas	 	12.7	 	4%	 8.6	 	28	
1b)	Private	 	11.6	 	10%	 9.5	 	5.5	
1c)	Decreasing			




would	 increase	 the	NPV	by	43%,	at	$28	billion.	 	This	highlights	 the	high	sensitivity	of	 the	overall	
profitability	 of	 shale	 gas	 extraction	 to	 the	 wholesale	 gas	 price.	 Conversely,	 should	 gas	 prices	






Finally,	 increasing	 the	 discount	 rate	 to	 10%	 also	 reduces	 the	 profitability	 of	 shale	 gas	 extraction	










The	 volume	 and	 geological	 characteristics	 of	 shale	 gas	 resources	 in	 Europe	 remain	 speculative.	
Besides,	experimental	drilling	has	remained	very	scarce.	 It	 is	 therefore	not	possible	to	assess	well	





then	 analyze	 the	 specificities	 of	 the	 European	 context,	 notably	 in	 terms	 of	 gas	 price	 formation,	
drilling	costs	and	environmental	regulations,	to	define	hypotheses	reflecting	these	particularities.	
	






breakeven	price	of	shale	gas	extraction	would	be	high	and	 the	profitability	 relatively	 low.	 Indeed,	
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Annex	
Figure	7:	Central	scenario	results	
Annual	natural	gas	production	 Cash	flow	
Figure	8:	Zero	NPV	scenario	results	
Annual	natural	gas	production	 Cash	flow	
Figure	9:	Extreme	scenario	results	
Annual	natural	gas	production	 Cash	flow	
Figure	10:	Central	scenario,	Wet	gas	variant	results	
Annual	natural	gas	production	 Cash	flow	
Figure	11:	Central	scenario,	Private	variant	results	
Annual	natural	gas	production	 Cash	flow	
Figure	12:	Central	scenario,	Decreasing	gas	price	results	
Annual	natural	gas	production	 Cash	flow	
 
